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a b s t r a c t
We address an optimization problem in which two agents, each with a set of weighted
items, compete in order to maximize the total weight of their winning sets. The latter are
built according to a sequential game consisting in a fixed number of rounds. In every round
each agent submits one item for possible inclusion in its winning set.We study two natural
rules to decide the winner of each round.
For both ruleswe deal with the problem fromdifferent perspectives. From a centralized
point of view, we investigate (i) the structure and the number of efficient (i.e. Pareto
optimal) solutions, (ii) the complexity of finding such solutions, (iii) the best–worst ratio,
i.e. the ratio between the efficient solution with largest and smallest total weight, and (iv)
existence of Nash equilibria.
Finally, we address the problem from a single agent perspective.We consider preventive
or maximin strategies, optimizing the objective of the agent in the worst case, and best
response strategies, where the items submitted by the other agent are known in advance
either in each round (on-line) or for the whole game (off-line).
© 2010 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction
We consider a multi-agent problem where agents compete to fill a joint solution set with their items. We focus on the
following situation: There are two agents, each of them owning one of two disjoint sets of weighted items. The agents have
to select items from their set for putting them in a solution set. This process proceeds in a fixed number of rounds. In every
round each of the two agents selects exactly one of its items and submits the item for possible inclusion in the solution
set. A central decision mechanism chooses one of the items as the ‘‘winner’’ of this round. The winning item is permanently
included in the solution set.We consider two versions of the problem, depending onwhether the losing item is permanently
discarded or can be reused in the succeeding rounds. Each agent wants tomaximize its total solution valuewhich is given by
the total weight of its items included in the solution set. We assume complete information, i.e. both agents know all items’
weights.
This problem is motivated by the following application scenario. Interim job agencies manage professionals with the
same qualification (e.g. interpreters, models, musicians, security personnel, etc.) butwith a different cost (hourly rate) based
on their experience, reputation, special skills etc. These professionals are placed with companies or other employers for a
limited period to perform a certain job.We consider two competing job agencies (the agents) who receive from time to time
✩ A preliminary version of this work appeared in the Proceedings of the First International Conference on Algorithmic Decision Theory, Venice, Italy,
October 20–23, 2009 (Nicosia et al. (2009) [11]).∗ Corresponding author. Fax: +39 0672597305.
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(in each round) a request for providing personnel for a single job. For each such request, each of the two companies offers
one candidate, but only one of the two offers will be accepted by the employer.
There are two obvious decision criteria for the employer: Either all candidates are more or less equally capable and the
employer selects the offer with the lower cost. Or the costs correlate with the individual abilities of each professional and
the employer selects the best candidate thus accepting the higher cost. The profit of the job agency is proportional to the
total cost of all its selected candidates. In general, if a candidate is not selected for a certain job, he or shemaywell be offered
again for a future request. However, for some areas of personal taste (artists, models, etc.) an employermight not reconsider
a person that was already rejected before. The correspondence to the general problem described above is obvious.
1.1. Related literature
The problem we address can be regarded as a single-suit card game in which each of two players chooses a card from its
hand. The highest value card wins and each card can be used only once. In [12] the authors study a zero-sum game in which
the cards are submitted simultaneously and the players want to maximize the total value of the won cards. In [7,13] the
so called whistette game is addressed. There is a totally ordered suit of 2n cards, distributed between the two players. The
player who has the lead plays first on each trick. The player with the higher card wins a trick and obtains the lead. Players
want to maximize the number of won tricks.
Moreover, seed assignment in team sport tournaments, e.g. chess leagues, is indeed related to the problemwe deal with
in this paper. The players of each team are ordered and each player faces the opponent on the same ordered position of
the other teams’ list. However, the ordering of players may be restricted to obey an established ranking (e.g. ELO points)
to some extent. There the objective is to maximize the number of wins while our problem aims at the maximization of the
total weight of all winning rounds.
Another problem strictly related to ours and the above described seeds assignment is addressed in [8], where the authors
investigate optimal strategies on how to choose a player (item) for the nextmatch (round) in a game consisting of a sequence
of matches. Two types of games are considered, given a winning probability for every pair of competing players. In the first
type, after each match, the loser is eliminated from the list of remaining players while the winner remains in the list. In the
second type, both players are eliminated after each match.
In addition, our problem can be viewed as a special knapsack game where two agents try to fit their items in a bounded
common solution set in order tomaximize their profits. In our case,we have a unit size for the items and a specialmechanism
to decide which items fit, i.e. are accepted in the common knapsack. Although the problem that we address in this work is
relatively new, 0–1 knapsack problems (KP) in a multi-decision environment have been considered in the literature for two
decades: from game-theoretic to auction applications there is a variety of papers dealing with this classical combinatorial
optimization problem. Hereafter, we only report a few of them.
A related problem in which different players try to fit their own items in a common knapsack is the so called knapsack
sharing problem studied by several authors (see for instance [5,6]). A single objective function that tries to balance the
profits among the players is considered in a centralized perspective. Another interesting game, based on the maximum 0–1
knapsack, interpreted as a special on-line problem, is addressed in [9] where a two person zero-sum game, called a knapsack
game, is considered. Knapsack problems are also addressed in the context of auctions. For instance, in [1], an application for
selling advertisements on Internet search engines is considered. In particular, there are n agents wishing to place an item
in the knapsack and each agent gives a private valuation for having an item in the knapsack, while each item has a publicly
known size. In [3], a two-agent knapsack problemwhere one agent (the leader) controls the capacity of a knapsack, and the
other (the follower) solves the resulting knapsack problem, is tackled by dynamic programming techniques.
Finally, note that the minimization version of our competing subset selection problem is addressed in [10].
1.2. Formal problem setting
In the following, A resp. B indicate the agents’ names each of them owning a set of n items, where item i has weight ai
resp. bi. Throughout this paper we assume the items to be sorted in decreasing order of weights, i.e. a1 ≥ a2 ≥ · · · ≥ an
resp. b1 ≥ b2 ≥ · · · ≥ bn. Sometimes we will identify items by their weight. All information about the input list of items is
public.
The game is performed over c rounds and c is known by the two agents. In each round both of the two agents
simultaneously submit one of their items, say ai and bj. We consider the two most natural rules for deciding which of the
two submitted items wins and is added to the solution set.
Rule 1 (R1): if ai ≥ bj then Awins;
Rule 2 (R2): if ai ≤ bj then Awins.1
Moreover, under both rules, we deal with two different scenarios.
Single-use items: each losing item is discarded and cannot be submitted a second time;
Reusable items: each losing item can be reused for submission in the succeeding rounds.
1 In case of a tie we assume that A always wins.
G. Nicosia et al. / Discrete Applied Mathematics 159 (2011) 1865–1877 1867
Table 1
Summary of results.
Problem type PO recogn. # PO sol. Nash-Eq. Best–worst ratio Maximin Best resp.
CSS(R1, single) Poly O(c) No 2 Trivial 2-apx
CSS(R1, reuse) Poly O(c) Yes Unbounded Algor. 2-apx
CSS(R2, single) NP-hard Ω(2c) No Unbounded Algor. Opt
CSS(R2, reuse) Poly O(c) Open Unbounded if n > cc if n = c Algor. Unbounded
In conclusion, we tackle four different versions of the competitive subset selection problem (CSS), which we denote as
CSS(α, β), where α ∈ {R1, R2} depending on the rule in force and β ∈ {single, reuse} depending on the treatment of the
losing items.
This problem can be represented by a graph model. Each agent’s item is associated to a node of a weighted complete
bipartite graph G = (V A ∪ V B, EA∪˙EB). An arc (i, j) belongs to EA or to EB depending on the winner of a comparison of ai and
bj, which of course depends on the applied selection rule.
Rule R1: arc (i, j)with weightwij = max{ai, bj} belongs to EA if ai ≥ bj, i.e. if Awins, otherwise it belongs to EB;
Rule R2: arc (i, j)with weightwij = min{ai, bj} belongs to EA if ai ≤ bj, i.e. if Awins, otherwise it belongs to EB;
Every pair of items (ai, bj) submitted simultaneously in one round can be represented by an arc (i, j) between the two
corresponding nodes. Hence, any solution may be represented as a set M of c arcs on G. The total weight of items in the
solution for agent A is given byW A(M) =∑ij∈M∩EA wij and that of B byW B(M) =∑ij∈M∩EB wij.
Note that, in the case of single-use items, the setM is amatching onG of cardinality c. Thus, determining a global optimum
maximizing the sumof the two agents’weights can be done in polynomial time by solving aweighted cardinality assignment
problem [4]. Yet, when losing items are reusable,M may not be a matching, however it is easy to describe the set of feasible
solutions using a linear program, whose set of constraints is a proper subset of the constraints used for the single-use items
case.
Indeed, in Section 2, we show that the global optimum for all versions of CSS can be found in a straightforward way,
without recurring to matching techniques or linear programming.
1.3. Our results
The problem we deal with in this paper is viewed from different perspectives. We first consider it from a centralized
point of view as a bicriteria optimization problem and study the structure of efficient, i.e. Pareto optimal (PO) solutions
(Section 2). We give bounds on the ratio between the efficient solutions with largest and smallest total weight (Section 2.2)
and characterize the computational complexity of finding one and/or all Pareto optimal solutions (Section 2.1). Moreover,
we discuss the existence of pure Nash equilibria (Section 2.3).
In addition, in Section 3, we address the problem from a single agent perspective.We consider the problem of optimizing
the objective of one agent when partial information on the sequence of items submitted by the other is given. We consider
two different scenarios: In the first one, the sequence of the second agent is completely unknown, and one seeks strategies
that maximize the weight of the first agent in the worst case (Section 3.1). In game theory literature, this is often referred to
as a maximin strategy. In the second scenario, the items submitted by the other agent are known in advance in each round
and we propose best response strategies for the first agent (Section 3.2).
Our results are summarized in Table 1. Although most of the results for the reusable items scenario are similar to those
of the single-use items case and can be shown by slightly modifying the arguments, there are a few interesting differences
between the two scenarios.
2. Efficient solutions and equilibria
In this section we investigate the solution structure in an off-line perspective, i.e. we consider the problem from a
centralized and static point of view and look for Pareto efficient solutions. Then, we show that under both rules, no pure
Nash equilibria exist, in general.
2.1. Pareto efficient solutions
Using the same terminology as in multicriteria optimization, a solution M is called Pareto efficient or simply efficient or
nondominated if there exist no solution M ′ such that W A(M) ≤ W A(M ′),W B(M) ≤ W B(M ′) and W A(M) + W B(M) <
W A(M ′)+W B(M ′).
We start our investigation with Rule 1 and notice that in this case each agent always submits its c largest items. Indeed,
submitting voluntarily smaller items the attained total weight would be dominated by switching to the larger items. So, in
the remainder of this section, without loss of generality, under Rule 1 we assume c = n.
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Theorem 1. Problem CSS(R1, single) has at most c + 1 efficient solutions. These can be computed in polynomial time.
Proof. Suppose that a feasible solution exists such that agent A wins k rounds and therefore B wins the remaining c − k
rounds. W.l.o.g. we assume a1 > b1 (otherwise we can exchange the roles of A and B). Since a1 can win against any item of
B, we always have k ≥ 1 if A is rational. Otherwise, if A ‘‘voluntarily’’ decides to lose all rounds by submitting at each round
an item smaller than the corresponding B item, kmay also be equal to 0.
By a simple pair interchange argument one can see that in this case the solution where A (B resp.) wins with its heaviest
k (c − k resp.) items is also feasible. Clearly, it is also nondominated. If k ≥ 1, the structure of the resulting solution is such
that item ai is matched to bc−k+i for i = 1, . . . , k, and to bi−k for i = k+1, . . . , c. Otherwise, for k = 0we have an additional
efficient solution withW A = 0 andW B =∑ci=1 bi.
Computing the solution values for all c + 1 efficient solutions can be done in linear time by one scan through the list of
items after sorting the items. Giving also the corresponding pairs of items explicitly as output would require O(n2) time. 
A straightforward consequence of the above result is that, finding the global optimum, i.e. the solution M∗ for which
W A(M∗)+W B(M∗) is maximum, can be done in a simple way in polynomial time also without solving a matching problem,
sinceM∗ is a Pareto efficient solution.
Even in the reusable items case, under Rule 1, finding the Pareto efficient solutions is an easy task. In particular, the
following results can be proved similarly as above.
Theorem 2. Problem CSS(R1, reuse) has at most c + 1 efficient solutions. These can be computed in polynomial time.
Also in this case, a global optimum is attained when the best c items in {a1, . . . , an, b1, . . . , bn}win.
Turning to Rule 2, we observe that it is not a trivial task to select the ‘‘best’’ c items to submit among the n available.
Picking only large itemsmay result in toomany losses, a restriction to the smallest items increases the chances to winmany
rounds but the gain from these victories may be quite small. Hence, we first restrict our attention to the case c = n. In this
case we can show the following results for the case with single-use items.
Theorem 3. For c = n Problem CSS(R2, single)may have an exponential number of efficient solutions.
Proof. Consider the following instance of CSS(R2, single) for some small ε > 0 in which, for ease of presentation, the items
are sorted in increasing order.
Agent A Agent B
a1 0 b1 ε
ai 2i−2 bi ai + ε i = 2, . . . , c
For any set S ⊆ {2, . . . , c − 1} consider the solution M where an item ai wins and, at the same time, bi loses if and only if
i ∈ S ∪{1}. It is always possible to construct such anM: clearly, a1 always wins; then, if i ∈ S, ai is matched to bi, else (i ∉ S)
ai is matched to some bj, with j < i, j ∉ S. InM, a1 is matched to b1 or bc and ac is always losing.
Neglecting the ε values, the sum of the weights W A(M) + W B(M) is constant and equals 2c−1 − 1. Therefore, for any
possible choice of S, it is possible to obtain an efficient solution since the resulting values ofW A(M) are all different. Thus,
there are exponentially many efficient solutions. 
We now show that, in the single-use items case under Rule 2, the problem of deciding whether a certain given objective
for each agent can be achieved is NP -complete by reducing Partition to our problem. This implies that finding efficient
solutions under Rule 2 is in general anNP -hard task. To this purpose, we consider the following decision problem.
Recognition CSS(R2, single):
Instance: positive integers ai and bi, i = 1, . . . , n; two positive valuesW A andW B.
Question: Is there a solution (matching)M of CSS(R2, single) such thatW A(M) ≥ W A andW B(M) ≥ W B?
Theorem 4. Recognition CSS(R2, single) isNP -complete.
Proof. Consider an instance I of Partitionwith integer valued items {v1, v2, . . . , vn} and∑ni=1 vi = V . Assume v1 < v2 <· · · < vn.
For T > vn and ε < 1/(n+ 1), build an instance I ′ of Recognition CSS(R2, single) as follows:
(I ′)
a0 = T , b0 = ε,
ai = vi, bi = vi + ε, i = 1, . . . , n,
W A = W B = V
2
.
Let I be a YES-instance of Partition. Then it is easy to build a solutionM of I ′ such thatW A(M) = V/2 andW B(M) ≥ V/2.
Let S ⊆ {1, 2, . . . , n} be such that∑i∈S vi = V/2 and S¯ = {0, 1, . . . , n} \ S. The required solution M is given as follows:
Each item i of Awith i ∈ S is matched to the corresponding item i of B, while each item j of Bwith j ∈ S¯ is matched to
argmin{ah | h ∈ S¯, ah > bj}.
Clearly, the two agents total weights are:W A(M) =∑i∈S ai = V/2 andW B(M) =∑i∈S¯ bi ≥ V/2.
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Now, let I ′ be a YES-instance of Recognition CSS(R2, single) andM be a solution of I ′ such that S¯ ⊆ {0, 1, 2, . . . , n} is the







ai + ε ≥ V/2
and W A(M) ≥ V/2. Note that, since each winning item i of A is matched to a losing item of B with larger weight, the total
weight LB of the ‘‘losing’’ items of agent B is such that LB =∑i∈S bi ≥ W A(M) ≥ V/2. Since, LB +W B(M) = V + (n+ 1)ε,
the vi are all integers and ε < 1/(n+ 1), then∑i∈S vi =∑i∈S¯ vi = V/2. 
Observe that the above proof shows that the problem is NP -hard even if c = n, i.e. the items to be submitted do not
have to be selected from a larger ground set.
Although finding efficient solutions for CSS(R2, single) isNP -hard, the global optimumM∗ can be found in polynomial
time using matching techniques [4] as already mentioned in Section 1.2. However, it is easy to see that for any value of
c ≤ n, wemay compute a global optimal solution in a straightforwardway by settingM∗ = {(a1, b1), (a2, b2), . . . , (ac, bc)}.
Indeed, assuming a1 > b1, A will lose with item a1 in any case and B can score its largest possible gain. This argument can
be repeated over all rounds.
Unlike the above case, when items are reusable, under Rule 2 finding Pareto efficient solutions becomes an easy task
since the choice of the losing items has no consequence.
Theorem 5. Problem CSS(R2, reuse) has at most c + 1 efficient solutions in general and at most c efficient solutions for c = n.
Proof. Assume there is a feasible solution in which A wins exactly k rounds. Then, the following is the only (in terms of
objective values) corresponding efficient solution. Without loss of generality, assume b1 > a1, let bj be the largest among
the B items such that bj < a1. Then, all B items bj, bj+1, . . . , bj+c−k−1 are matched to a1 (that loses). All items a1, a2, . . . , ak
are matched to b1.
For c = n the case k = 0 is impossible since Awill certainly win the round where B submits b1. 
2.2. Best–worst ratio
In this section we give an estimate of the ratio between the global optimum, i.e. the best efficient solution, and the value
of any efficient solution. This concept is somehow connected to the notion of the price of anarchy, studied in algorithmic
game theory, which is usually defined as the worst possible ratio between the value of the global (social) optimum and the
value of a solution derived by a selfish optimization.








where E is the set of efficient solutions andW ∗ is the global optimum value.
In the following, we show that this ratio can be arbitrarily high for Problems CSS(R2, single), CSS(R1, reuse), and
CSS(R2, reuse)with c < n, while for Problems CSS(R1, single) and CSS(R2, reuse)with c = n this ratio is limited.
Theorem 6. The best–worst ratio of CSS(R1, single) is 2.
Proof. Let X = {a1, a2, . . . , ac} ∪ {b1, b2, . . . , bc} and number the items of X in non-increasing order of weights,
X = {x1, x2, . . . , x2c}. Obviously, the global optimum value is bounded from above by the sum of the c largest items,
i.e.W ∗ ≤∑ci=1 xi. On the other hand, even the value of the efficient solution M¯ with theworst global value can be bounded
from below. In fact, in M¯ , the set X can be partitioned into the two sets XV and X L of winning and losing items. Clearly
|XV | = |X L| = c . Since, under Rule 1, each winning item is matched to an item with smaller weight, thenW (XV ) ≥ W (X L).
ThereforeW A(M¯)+W B(M¯) = W (XV ) ≥ W (X)/2. SinceW (X) ≥ W ∗, the statement follows. 
To show that the bound of 2 can be reached, consider the following example for a large constant T .
Example 7.
Agent A Agent B
a1 T b1 T − 1
a2 2 b2 1
Let c = 2. Agent A submits items ⟨a1, a2⟩. There are only two efficient solutions: If B submits b1 first and b2 second thus
losing both rounds, the global solution value is T + 2. If B exchanges the order of its submissions then Awins the first round
and B the second yielding a global solution value of 2T − 1. Therefore, for T tending to infinity, the best–worst ratio tends
to 2.
Theorem 8. The best worst ratio of Problem CSS(R2, reuse) when n = c is c.
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Proof. Assuming n = c and b1 > a1, there can be only c efficient solutions, since A must win at least one round, namely
when B plays b1 (see Theorem 5). Let j′ := min{j | bj < a1, j = 1, . . . , n}. Each of the c efficient solutions has a total weight
Wk :=∑ki=1 ai+∑j′+c−k−1j=j′ bj for k = 1, . . . , c. It follows from the sorting of theweights and the definition of j′ thatWk ≥ a1
andWk ≤ c a1 for all k = 1, . . . , c . Hence, the best worst ratio can be at most c. 
To show that the bound of Theorem 8 is tight, consider the following example.
Example 9.
Agent A Agent B
a1 T b1 T + 1
ai 1 bi T − 1 i = 2, . . . , c
If B sticks to submitting b1 it always loses which yields an efficient solution with total weight
∑c
i=1 ai = T + (c − 1). If A
sticks to submitting a1 and B submits ⟨b2, . . . , bc, b1⟩ we get another efficient solution with total weight∑cj=2 bj + a1 =
(c − 1)(T − 1)+ T . Obviously, for T tending to infinity the ratio between the total weights of these two efficient solutions
approaches c.
Negative results can be derived by using instances where the ratio between the global optimum and the value of an efficient
solution is unbounded.
Theorem 10. The best–worst ratio of Problem CSS(R2, reuse) if n > c can be arbitrarily high.
Proof. Consider the following instance of CSS(R2, reuse)with n = 2 and c = 1.
Agent A Agent B
a1 T b1 T + 1
a2 2 b2 1
If agent B submits b1 it will lose in any case. Therefore, any selfish strategy of B will submit b2 gaining in any caseW B = 1,
while agent Awill lose and haveW A = 0. A global optimumwould submit a1 and b1 yielding a total weight of T . Hence, for
T tending to infinity, the best–worst ratio is unbounded. 
Data of Example 7 and the instance in the proof of Theorem 10 can be used to show that the following theorem holds for
c = n and c < n, respectively.
Theorem 11. The best–worst ratio of Problem CSS(R2, single) can be arbitrarily high.
We conclude our analysis on the best–worst ratio with the following theorem.
Theorem 12. The best–worst ratio of CSS(R1, reuse) can be arbitrarily high.
Proof. Consider the following instance with n = c = 2.
Agent A Agent B
a1 T b1 2
a2 1 b2 2
Clearly, there are only two efficient solutions. Agent A submits items ⟨a1, a2⟩ or ⟨a2, a2⟩. In the first case the global solution
value is T + 2, while in the second it is 4. Therefore, for T tending to infinity, the best–worst ratio is unbounded. 
2.3. Nash equilibria
It is easy to show that when losing items cannot be reused, under both rules, no Nash equilibria exist, except for trivial
instances where only one Pareto optimum exists. The following example presents an instance in which there are no Nash
equilibria in the case of single-use items.
Example 13.
Agent A Agent B
a1 10 b1 12
a2 5 b2 6
There are c = n = 2 rounds. Table 2 gives the normal-form representations of the game under the two rules. Assume,
under Rule 1, that A submits a1 and a2 in the first and second round, respectively. Then the best sequence for B is ⟨b1, b2⟩.
Clearly, when B submits the latter sequence, A changes its own, by swapping a1 with a2. So, A’s strategy ⟨a1, a2⟩ is not in a
Nash equilibrium. An analogous reasoning applies for the only other possible sequence for A, ⟨a2, a1⟩. So, under Rule 1, no
Nash equilibrium exists. The same argument applies for Rule 2.
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Table 2
Payoffs of agents A and B with data of Example 13 under Rule
1 and 2 and single-use items.
⟨b1, b2⟩ ⟨b2, b1⟩ ⟨b1, b2⟩ ⟨b2, b1⟩
⟨a1, a2⟩ 0,18 10,12 ⟨a1, a2⟩ 15,0 5,6
⟨a2, a1⟩ 10,12 0,18 ⟨a2, a1⟩ 5,6 15,0
When dealing with the reusable items case under Rule 1, the results are different. When both agents follow a greedy
strategy (i.e. in each round, submit the largest available item) they reach a global optimum and the c overall largest items
win. This solution corresponds to a Nash equilibrium, since there is no convenience for one agent to deviate from the greedy
strategy when the other agent follows the same greedy strategy. In conclusion, the following statement holds.
Remark 14. Problem CSS(R1, reuse) admits a Nash equilibrium.
It is an open question to determine a Nash equilibrium, if it exists, for Problem CSS(R2, reuse). Note that a greedy strategy,
where each agent submits its smallest remaining item, does not yield a Nash equilibrium. It may be convenient for an agent
to lose one round ‘‘on purpose’’ to get rid of a small item of its opponent and then win the remaining rounds with larger
items.
3. Strategies of agents
In this section we address the problem of devising a strategy, that is an algorithm that suggests an agent which item to
submit at each round, in order to maximize the agent’s weight under different information scenarios.
When dealing with the case where each item could be submitted only once (single-use-items case), the definition of a
strategy of an agent is quite simple. It could be represented by an ordered list of c different items, called a submission list, or
by an algorithm producing it. Clearly, any such list is a feasible strategy.
When items are reusable and thusmay appear several times in a submission list, its feasibility depends on the submissions
of the other agent, since items cannot be reused after winning a round. Thus, a static list of items can be given as a strategy
only if each item in the list is submitted, possibly several times, until it wins. However, a more appropriate and general way
to define a strategy is by an algorithmwhich generates, in every round, the item to be submitted depending on the currently
still available items.
Another classification distinguishes between adaptative strategies, which take into account the other agent’s strategy,
and non-adaptative strategies (which do not). For instance, any submission list is non-adaptative. In the remainder of the
paper we will propose different examples of both types of strategies.
Hereafter we consider two different ‘‘knowledge scenarios’’ for an agent, say B. In the first one, the strategy of agent A
is completely unknown and we look for an algorithm guaranteeing the maximum weight in the worst possible case for B
(maximin strategy). We show that for Rule 2 non-trivial algorithms can be developed while under Rule 1 it only remains for
B to submit its largest items.
In the second scenario, agent B gets to know the item submitted by agent A in every round beforemaking its own move.
We will try to answer the question how B should select its items under such an advantageous asymmetry of information. In
this particular context, the strategy adopted by agent B is referred to as the best response strategy.
Somewhat surprisingly, it will turn out that, in the single-use items case, for Rule 2 (CSS(R2, single)) an optimal best
response strategy can be found while for the reusable case (CSS(R2, reuse)) any strategy may yield the worst possible result
for certain instances. For Rule 1 (CSS(R1, single)) the existence of an optimal best response strategy can be ruled out even if
an algorithm with an a priori guarantee on the quality of the solution can be found. An analogous result can be proven for
the reusable items case under Rule 1 (CSS(R1, reuse)).
3.1. Maximin strategies
In order to formally introduce the concept of maximin strategy, we give the following definitions. Let SA (SB) be the set
of strategies for agent A (B). For every pair of strategies SA ∈ SA, SB ∈ SB,M(SA, SB) denotes the resulting solution. Then, a
maximin strategy MMSB ∈ SB of agent B is defined as follows:








The definition ofMMSA is analogous.
In the single-use items case, i.e. for Problems CSS(R1, single) and CSS(R2, single), it can be observed that once the set
S(B) ⊆ {b1, . . . , bn} of c items submitted by agent B is fixed, in the worst case agent Amayminimize the weight attained by
B by suitably matching its items to those in S(B) (cf. Section 2.1). Hence, it does not matter in which order B submits its item
set S(B), it may always end up with the worst possible solution under S(B). Let Wˆ B(S(B)) be the total weight for B in such a
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solution. It remains for a maximin strategy of agent B to determine its set of submitted items in the best possible way, i.e.
S(B) = argmax{Wˆ B(X) | X ⊆ {b1, . . . , bn}, |X | = c}.
If n = c , there is nothing to choose since S(B) = {b1, . . . , bn}, and no strategy can avoid to obtain theworst possible solution
for B. In this case any strategy is technically a maximin strategy.
If n > c , under Rule 1, themaximin strategy of B obviously consists of choosing its c largest items, i.e. S(B) = {b1, . . . , bc}.
Under Rule 2, the selection of S(B) is more involved. First observe that, since Awants to minimize B’s total weight, we may
restrict our analysis to the case in which A plays its c smallest items. A maximin strategy is performed by the following
algorithmMaximinSingle 2. Recall that the items are sorted in decreasing order of weight.
Algorithm 1 Algorithm for agent B performing a maximin strategy for Problem CSS(R2, single).
MaximinSingle 2
1: Wˆ B := 0
2: for i = 1, . . . , n− c + 1 do
3: S(B) := {bi, bi+1, . . . , bi+c−1}
4: S(A) := {ał | ał ≤ bi} ∩ {an−c+1, . . . , an}
5: find the smallest item bk ∈ S(B) such that every item bł ∈ {bi, . . . , bk} can be matched to an item aj in S(A) with
aj ≤ bł
6: Wˆ B := max{Wˆ B, ∑i+c−1ł=k+1 bł} {k+ 1 is the largest winning item in S(B)}
7: end for
8: output the set S(B) that defines Wˆ B
Theorem 15. MaximinSingle 2 is a maximin strategy for CSS(R2, single).
Proof. At first we will show that for an arbitrary set S(B) submitted by B, the result of agent A acting in a malicious way
aiming at minimizing the total gain of B will always lead to a bipartitioning of S(B) such that A wins against the largest k
items and loses against the remaining smallest c − k items of B for some k in 0, 1, . . . , c. Assume otherwise: If there is an
item bℓ < bk+1 such that Awins against bℓ, then A could win with the same item against bk−1 instead, thus diminishing the
weight won by B. Hence, the winning items of Bmust be a consecutive interval of S(B).
Secondly,we show that it is always better (or at least notworse) for B to select a subset of items consisting of a consecutive
subsequence of items from {1, . . . , n}. Indeed, following from the above bipartition argument Bwins all items smaller than
some bk and thus should always submit the largest c − k items with weight ≤ bk to maximize its gain, i.e. a consecutive
interval. Moreover, since B will lose all items with weight ≥ bk, B can just as well submit the smallest k − 1 items among
these, yielding altogether a consecutive interval.
It remains to compute the best such interval. AlgorithmMaximinSingle 2 does so by simply checking each of the n−c+1
possibilities. For each candidate set S(B) the ‘‘breakpoint’’ bk is determined in line 5. This can be done by simply going down
through the ordered set of items of S(B) and finding a smaller, i.e. winning, matching partner from S(A) for each of them.
Obviously, as soon as there is no such partner for bk+1, no item of S(B)with an even smaller weight can lose against A. 
When dealing with maximin strategies, the possibility of reusing losing items, unlike what is observed in the single-use
items case, gives an agent more possibilities to maximize its weight in the worst case. We first consider Rule 1 and provide
the following simple greedy algorithm.
Algorithm 2 Algorithm for agent B performing a maximin strategy for problem CSS(R1, reuse).
MaximinReuse 1
1: In each round B submits the largest available item.
Theorem 16. MaximinReuse 1 is a maximin strategy for CSS(R1, reuse).
Proof. Consider the union of the two item sets {a1, . . . , an, b1, . . . , bn} and determine the subset containing the c largest
items of this set. Assume that this subset consists of ℓ items of A and c − ℓ items of B.
Now consider the situation in which agent A applies the greedy strategy MaximinReuse 1 against an arbitrary strategy
SB of agent B. By the above definition there are at most c − ℓ items of B with weight larger than aℓ. Hence, no strategy of B
can prevent A from winning items a1, . . . , aℓ by strategyMaximinReuse 1 during c rounds. It follows that for any strategy
SB, agent B can win at most c − ℓ rounds againstMaximinReuse 1. An upper bound on the total solution weight of B playing
againstMaximinReuse 1 is therefore given by the largest items
∑c−ℓ














where S∗A is the strategyMaximinReuse 1 for A.
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Now if B applies the greedy strategyMaximinReuse 1, it follows by a similar reasoning that no strategy of A can prevent
B from winning items b1, . . . , bc−ℓ. Hence, for an arbitrary strategy of A the output ofMaximinReuse 1 for B is not smaller
than an upper bound on a maximin strategy which proves the theorem. 
Turning to Rule 2, consider the following algorithm.
Algorithm 3 Algorithm for agent B performing a maximin strategy for Problem CSS(R2, reuse).
MaximinReuse 2
1: for i = 1, . . . , n do
2: nA(i)← min{ |{aj | aj ≤ bi}| , c}
3: nB(i)← min{c − nA(i), n− i+ 1}
4: if nB(i) > 0 then
5: f B(i)←∑i+nB(i)−1k=i bk
6: else
7: f B(i)← 0
8: end if
9: end for
10: i∗ ← argmaxi=1,...,n f B(i)
11: In each round submit the largest available item with weight≤ bi∗ if it exists. Else, submit an arbitrary item.
In line 2we compute the number of items of Awinning against bi. Line 3 determines the number of items of Bwithweight
at most bi which agent B is guaranteed to win after Amay have successfully submitted all nA(i) items beating bi. f B(i) in lines
5 and 7 contains the total weight which Bwould win during these nB(i) successful rounds. The strategy indicated in line 11
starts by submitting bi∗ until it wins and proceeds with items bi∗+1, bi∗+2, . . . .
Theorem 17. MaximinReuse 2 is a maximin strategy for Problem CSS(R2, reuse).
Proof. Consider a greedy strategy Gmin for agent A consisting of submitting the smallest available item in every round in a
game against an arbitrary strategy SB of agent B. A will win some ℓ rounds out of c. By the definition of Gmin the winning
items will be the ℓ smallest items of A. Agent B wins the remaining c − ℓ rounds. Let bi′ be the largest of B’s winning items
under SB. The total solution weight of B cannot be better than bi′ plus the weight of the c − ℓ − 1 immediately following
items. It follows from Gmin that all items of Awith aj ≤ bi′ must have been submitted and won their rounds before bi′ wins.
In the notation ofMaximinReuse 2 this implies ℓ ≥ nA(i′).
Hence, the solution value of B against Gmin can be bounded from above by a function of its largest winning item i′ under
SB given by

















W B(M(Gmin, SB)) ≤ max
i′=1,...,n
W¯ B(i′).
It is easy to see that line 10 ofMaximinReuse 2 performs precisely this optimization task and i∗ yields the best value for i′.
Moreover,MaximinReuse 2 guarantees that B actually manages to win at least maxi′=1,...,n W¯ B(i′), no matter which strategy
A pursues. Hence, for an arbitrary strategy of A the output of MaximinReuse 2 is not smaller than an upper bound on a
maximin strategy which proves the theorem. 
It should be pointed out thatMaximinReuse 2 follows a strictly worst-case point of view and may be improved to take
advantage of strategies of A deviating from Gmin. Whenever an item b′ submitted by B according to line 11 wins a round
although there are still items available for A with weight <b′, (i.e. A missed a chance to win this round), the algorithm
should start from the beginning and recompute item i∗ for the remaining game. This may lead to an improved solution of B.
3.2. Best response strategies
Wenow consider the scenariowhere B only knows the submission of A in the current round and has to react immediately
before both agents move on to the next round. Recall that B knows the total number of rounds c . In the following sections
we show that for problems CSS(R1, single), CSS(R1, reuse), and CSS(R2, reuse), there is no optimal strategy for B. Indeed we
can show that no strategy of B under Rule 1 can have a competitive ratio [2] compared to the best off-line strategy better
than the golden ratio and that for problem CSS(R2, reuse)such a ratio is unbounded. Moreover, we show that, under Rule 1,
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a simple greedy-type algorithm has a worst-case tight competitive ratio of 2 (Sections 3.2.1 and 3.2.2). On the other hand,
an algorithm yielding an optimal off-line solution for Problem CSS(R2, single) exists (Section 3.2.3).
Note that, in the single-use items case, if B knows in advance the c items A submits (e.g., when n = c), it is easy to
devise an optimal response algorithm. This task can be accomplished by solving an off-line maximumweight c-assignment
problem (cf. Section 1.2).
3.2.1. Best response for CSS(R1, single)
Assume B does not know in advance the c items Awill submit (i.e., n > c and A not rational). The following lower bound
holds for any best response algorithm for CSS(R1, single).
Theorem 18. No on-line strategy of agent B against an arbitrary strategy of agent A can have a competitive ratio smaller than√
5+1
2 = 1.618 . . . for problem CSS(R1, single).
Proof. To prove the theorem we consider the following instance with c = 2, n = 3, where the parameter y is chosen such
that 2ε < y < 1.
Agent A Agent B
a1 2 b1 1+ ε
a2 1 b2 y
a3 2ε b3 ε
Wewill consider two (suboptimal) strategies of agentA: In both casesA starts by submitting a3. In strategy S1 it is followed
by a1, in strategy S2 by a2. Given the first item a3 there are only two ways for agent B to react:
In Case 1, B submits b2 thus winning this round. Against strategy S1, B loses the second round and the worst-case total
weight for Case 1 isW B1 = y.
In Case 2, B submits b1 andwins again. But against strategy S2, B loses again the second round and in theworst-case stops
with a total weightW B2 = 1+ ε.
However, an optimal off-line strategy of B against S1 would be ⟨b1, b2⟩ gaining a weight ofW ∗1 = 1+ ε, while against S2

























2 . Plugging in this value of y in the above equation yields
√
5+1
2 as a lower bound for the competitive ratio and
proves Theorem 18.
In the above analysis B submits its c = 2 largest items; however it is not hard to see that the same result is attainedwhen
Bmay decide to submit b3. 
The following greedy-type algorithm tries to win against every item submitted by Awith the largest item still available.
If this fails and a loss cannot be avoided in the current round the smallest remaining item is submitted.
Algorithm 4 Algorithm for agent B responding to the submissions of agent A for Problem CSS(R1, single).
Greedy Response 1
1: f ← 1 {index of largest available item}
2: ł← c {index of smallest available item}
3: repeat
4: A submits item a′
5: if bf > a′ then
6: B submits bf and wins
7: f ← f + 1
8: else
9: B submits bł and loses
10: ł← ł− 1
11: end if
12: until f < ł {all c rounds finished}
Theorem 19. Algorithm Greedy Response 1 has a tight competitive ratio of 2 for Problem CSS(R1, single).
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Proof. Let SA be the complete set of items submitted by A. At the end of the execution of Greedy Response 1 agent B has
added its k largest items into the solution and reached a total weight ofW B (k = f − 1 at the end of the algorithm).
It is easy to see that an optimal off-line solution against the same set SA will always consist of the largest k∗ items with
k∗ ≥ k. In this optimal strategy the items in set DB = {k+ 1, . . . , k∗} of B all win against some items in SA. This means that
at least the smallest items in SA must be potential losers against DB. Let j be the index of the c − (k∗ − k− 1) largest item in
SA. Then we have bk+1 > aj.
Considering the item bf = bℓ submitted by B in the last round of the game there are two cases to distinguish.
Case 1: bf loses. Since bf = bk+1 wouldwin against any of the k∗−k smallest items in SA, thesemust have been submitted
by A before. Moreover, at the rounds where these items were submitted, item bk+1 was still available and would yield a win
for B. By definition of Greedy Response 1 some other item of Bmust have won these rounds. Therefore, the total number of
wins for Bmust be at least k∗ − k, i.e. k ≥ k∗ − k, which proves the statement of the theorem.
Case 2: bf wins. In all rounds, in which A submitted one of the k∗ − k smallest items in SA, item bf was still available and
would have won against these items. As above, by the definition of Greedy Response 1 some other item of Bmust have won
these rounds and again k ≥ k∗ − k.
To show that the bound of 2 is tight consider the following instance of CSS(R1, single)with c = 2 rounds.
Agent A Agent B
a1 1+ ε b1 1+ 2ε
a2 1− ε b2 1+ε/2
a3 ε b3 1
Agent A submits a2 in the first round. Greedy Response 1 reacts with b1 and loses the second round, when A submits a1,
gaining a total weight of 1+ 2ε.
An optimal off-line strategy of Bwould reactwith b2 in the first round thuswinning both rounds and gaining 2+5/2ε. 
3.2.2. Best response for CSS(R1, reuse)
When items are reusable under Rule 1, we have similar results to the single-use items case described in Section 3.2.1. In
particular, Algorithm Greedy Response 1 guarantees the same competitive ratio.
Theorem 20. Algorithm Greedy Response 1 has a tight competitive ratio of 2 for Problem CSS(R1, reuse).
Observe that, since it does not matter which item is used to lose, the algorithm can be simplified: at each round B tries
to win with the largest available item. The proof of Theorem 20 is omitted since that of Theorem 19 applies. Moreover, with
the same arguments we can show that the golden ratio lower bound of Theorem 18 holds for Problem CSS(R1, reuse).
3.2.3. Best response for CSS(R2, single)
As in Rule 1, the following greedy-type algorithm for Rule 2 tries to win against every item submitted by A with the
largest possible winning item. If no such item exists, a losing item is determined which cannot worsen the remainder of the
solution for B. In fact, B does not want to waste a large item (because it can be beneficial to win in later rounds if A plays a
larger item) and it does not want to waste a small item (because small items have more chances to win in the future).
Therefore, we determine b¯ℓ as the best item for losing. All remaining items of Bwith weight larger than b¯ℓ are kept since
they can be matched to win against the largest items of A. This matching should be as large as possible. However, b¯ℓ can be
sacrificed since it is the largest item that does not increase the number of possible winning rounds in the future.
To avoid a tedious special treatment of ties we will assume in this subsection that all 2n items have different weights.
To illustrate the algorithm, consider the following example.
Example 21.
Agent A Agent B
a1 15 b1 10
a2 12 b2 9
a3 7 b3 8
a4 6 b4 5
a5 2 b5 4
a6 1 b6 3
Consider the first round (hence, a¯i = ai and b¯i = bi) and assume A plays a5 = 2. Then B is forced to lose. We determine
blose = b3 = 8 to lose.
This choice of blose preserves the chances for B to potentially use the larger items b1 and b2 to win against a1 and a2 and
the smaller items b4, b5 (and b6) to win against a3 and a4.
Theorem 22. Algorithm Greedy Response 2 yields the optimal off-line solution of Problem CSS(R2, single).
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Algorithm 5 Algorithm for agent B responding to the submissions of agent A for Problem CSS(R2, single).
Greedy Response 2
1: RA ← {a1, . . . , an} {set of remaining items for A}
2: RB ← {b1, . . . , bn} {set of remaining items for B}
3: repeat
4: A submits item a′, remove a′ from RA
5: bmin ← min{bi | bi ∈ RB}
6: if a′ > bmin then
7: bwin ← max{bi | bi < a′, bi ∈ RB}
8: B submits bwin and wins, remove bwin from RB
9: else
10: Renumber the items of RA = {a¯1, a¯2, . . . , a¯|RA|} (still sorted in decreasing order)
11: Renumber the items of RB = {b¯1, b¯2, . . . , b¯|RB|} (still sorted in decreasing order)
12: blose ← max{b¯i | b¯i > a¯i, a¯i ∈ RA, b¯i ∈ RB}
13: B submits blose and loses, remove blose from RB
14: end if
15: until all c rounds finished
Proof. We will consider round 1, where agent A submits a′, and show that also an optimal algorithm Opt cannot do better
than Greedy Response 2 and that the later does not diminish the range of options for an optimal strategy in the subsequent
rounds. Repeating this argument over all rounds yields the statement of the theorem.
Case 1: Bwins. What are the alternatives for Opt?
If Opt submits an item bj < bwin it earns a smaller weight in round 1. Unlike Greedy Response Rule 2, Opt can use bwin
to win in a subsequent round t . However, in this case Greedy Response 2 could submit bj in round t and win as well, since
bj < bwin. Obviously, the total weight of these two rounds would be the same for both algorithms.
If Opt chooses to submit an item bk > a′ and ‘‘voluntarily’’ loses, it can again use bwin to win in a later round. Greedy
Response 2 might be forced to lose in that round, but again the two algorithms end up with the same total weight for these
two rounds.
Case 2: B loses. First, let us note that in the special case b¯1 > a¯1, Greedy Response 2 will submit b¯ℓ = b¯1. Since b¯1 cannot
win in any future round, it clearly cannot violate optimality to submit b¯1 in a round which Bwill lose in any case.
Also for b¯1 < a¯1bℓ is well defined: since a′ < bmin and |RA| = |RB|, an index ℓ satisfying a¯ℓ < b¯ℓ always exists.
Now denote Aℓ := {a¯1, . . . , a¯ℓ} and Bℓ := {b¯1, . . . , b¯ℓ}. Since b¯i > a¯ℓ for all i ≤ ℓ, no item in Bℓ can win against a¯ℓ. On
the other hand, since b¯i < a¯i for all i < ℓ, each item in Bℓ \ {b¯ℓ} can be matched to win against an item in Aℓ \ {a¯ℓ}. Hence, B
can win against any subset of Aℓ \ {a¯ℓ} without using item b¯ℓ. Altogether the removal of b¯ℓ does not change the options of
Opt in any subsequent round. 
3.2.4. Best response for CSS(R2, reuse)
In this section, we show that for Problem CSS(R2, reuse), no best response strategy of B can have a bounded competitive
ratio compared to the best off-line strategy.
Theorem 23. No on-line strategy of agent B against an arbitrary strategy of agent A can have a bounded competitive ratio for
problem CSS(R2, reuse).
Proof. The theorem can be proved by considering an instance with c = 2 rounds and n = 3 items such that a1 > b1 >
a2 > b2 > b3 > a3 with b1 > b2 + b3.
Assume A uses one of the two following strategies: S1 considers the items in the order ⟨a2, a1⟩ and submits each item
until it wins. S2 submits the items a2, a3 in rounds 1 and 2 independently from the outcome of these rounds.
In the first round B can either win or lose. It can win with b2 or b3 which are both smaller than a2 (Case 1). To lose, B
would submit b1 > a2 (Case 2).
In Case 1, Awill follow S1 and submit a2 again in the second round. Then Bwins again with the remaining item b2 or b3.
So, in this case, B’s solution has a total weightW B1 = b2+b3, while an optimal solutionwould have reachedweightW ∗1 = b1
by submitting b1 in the first round (losing) and winning in the second round against a1.
In Case 2, A will submit a3 in the second round according to S2 and B cannot avoid to lose again thus reaching a total
weight W B2 = 0. On the other hand, an optimal solution against S2 would have weight W ∗2 = b2 reached by submitting b2
in the first round against a2.
Altogether the first case yields a lower bound of b1b2+b3 which can become arbitrarily high for b1 tending to infinity. The
second case yields an infinite lower bound for any choice of b2. This proves Theorem 23. 
Note that, in the reusable items case, both agents have more alternatives at each round with respect to the single use
case. Hence, although this case may appear ‘‘easier’’ than the corresponding single use problem, as shown in the proof of
Theorem 23, it is the fact that the ‘‘adversary’’ agent Amay reuse an item that does not allow B to give an optimal response.
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4. Conclusions
In this paper we address a multi-agent optimization problem where two agents compete to add items in a solution
set. We consider four different versions of the problem and, for all versions, we give results concerning the computational
complexity, the structure of efficient solutions, and some strategies for optimizing the objective of a single agent against the
other.
It is still an open question to determine a Nash Equilibrium, if it exists, for problem CSS(R2, reuse). With respect to the
single use case, where no Nash Equilibrium exists, the difficulty apparently lies in the larger number of alternatives due to
the possibility of reusing losing items.
Regarding the competitive ratio of best response strategies we manage to give either optimal algorithms or show that
no such algorithm can exist under Rule 2. For Rule 1 we show that this ratio cannot be smaller than the golden ratio
φ = 1.618 . . . . When c = 2, it is not hard to design an algorithm having an ‘‘optimal’’ competitive ratio of φ. However,
for the general case, we can only achieve a competitive ratio of 2 both for problems CSS(R1, single) and CSS(R1, reuse).
Hence, whether this ratio could be improved for c > 2 is another challenging issue.
This work also suggests other directions for future research. One is the design of algorithms to efficiently enumerate all
Pareto-optimal solutions for problem CSS(R2, single). Another is to extend our results to further relevant rules controlling
how an agent’s item is added to the solution set.
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